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Abstract: We develop a theory of decision making and General Equilibrium
for contingent markets when incomplete preferences are generated by second
order stochastic dominance. Demand, Pareto-optima and Equilibria domi-
nance are fully characterized. Demands and equilibrium allocations are non
increasing functions of the pricing density and Pareto-optimal allocations are
comonotone. They generalize mean-variance demands and CAPM equilib-
rium allocations which are non increasing ane functions of the pricing den-
sity. They are not observationaly distinguishable from those of von-Neumann-
Morgenstern decision makers with increasing strictly concave utilities nor from
those of strict risk averse non-expected utility maximizers.
We also show that expenditure functions associated to second order stochas-
tic dominance, provide microeconomic foundations for a class of law invariant
risk-measures used in mathematical nance.
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16, France1 Introduction
Decision theorists model risk by a stochastic order. It would therefore be
natural to use, in spite of their incomplete nature, a stochastic order rather
than a utility function, in problems of microeconomic of uncertainty, nance
or insurance. Although several papers have used a concept of demand or
expenditure or eciency for the order generated by second order stochastic
dominance, without naming it, there has never been a systematic theory of
individual decision making and General Equilibrium when incomplete prefer-
ences are generated by second order stochastic dominance (that we now on
denote by S.S.D.). One can note that the papers that have used S.S.D. belong
to a wide variety of literatures; eciency pricing (Peleg-Yaari(1975), Chew
and Zilcha (1990)), nance ( Ross-Dybvig (1982), Dybvig (1988), Kim (1994),
Jouini-Kallal (2001), risk-sharing (Lansberger and Meilijson (1994), to name
a few.
The rst aim of this paper is to provide such a theory for contingent or
complete markets. We shall rst show that demand, expenditure, Pareto-
optima and equilibria under second order stochastic dominance may be fully
characterized. We then show that they are not observationaly distinguish-
able from those of von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision makers with increasing
strictly concave utilities nor from those of strict risk averse non-expected util-
ity maximizers. They all have the same characteristics. The main tool of the
analysis is a result due to Peleg-Yaari (1975) that any non-increasing function
of the pricing density can be rationalized as the demand of some vNM EU
maximizer with strictly increasing and strictly concave utility index. More
precisely, let p 2 IRk
+ be a pricing density and let w 2 IR be a revenue. If x is
a non-increasing function of p fullling E(px) = w, then there exists a strictly
increasing and strictly concave function u such that x solves
(
maxE[u(c)] s.t.
E(pc)  E(px) = w
While in Decision theory, risk is associated to a stochastic order, in nance
and insurance, academics as well as practitionners have used measures of risk.
Contrary to the stochastic order approach, measures of risk induce complete
preferences on random variables. A standard measure of risk is value at risk. It
2has extensively been criticized by theorists. Other measures involving quan-
tiles (or generalized inverse of distribution functions), have been proposed
such as for example, law invariant coherent measures, premium principles (see
Atzner et al (1999), Denneberg (1990), F ollmer and Schied (2002)). These
measures are neither specically based on microeconomic behavior nor related
to equilibrium models.
Dybvig (1988) (an later Jouini-Kallal (2001) in the case of imperfections)
denes the "utility price" e(p;x) of a contingent claim x at pricing den-
sity p as the minimal expenditure to get a claim that is at least as good
as x for any risk averse investor with v.N.M. increasing utility: e(p;x) = (
minE(pc) s.t.
E(u(c))  E(u(x)) 8 u
. In the case of a uniform nite probability, Dybvig
(1988) proves that e(p;x) can be expressed in terms of F  1
p and F  1
x the quan-
tile functions of p and x: e(p;x) =
R 1
0 F 1
p (1   t)F  1
x (t)dt. As the Choquet
integral of a contingent claim with respect to a continuous convex distortion f
of a probability has value Ef(x) =
R 1
0 f0(1 t)F  1
x (t)dt, one can see that Ef(x)
is the minimal expenditure to get a claim that is at least as good as x for any
price distributed as f0 (if it exists). As these functionnals play a fundamental
role in the theory of law invariant coherent measures, this provides a way of
giving microeconomic foundations and potentially, an equilibrium analysis to
a class of risk measures.
A second aim of the paper is therefore to use expenditure functions for
S.S.D. to provide a class of law-invariant risk measures. We rst generalize
the formula giving e(p;x) to any nite probability space. We deduce that a
Choquet integral with respect to a continuous convex distortion f of a proba-
bility is a minimal expenditure under S.S.D. if there exists a price distributed
as f0. Building on Dybvig (1988), we next compare e(p;x) to a mean-variance
criterion. We show that the utility price increases with its discounted expected
value and decreases as the contingent claim becomes more disperse (the disper-
sion concept used is the order of dispersion introduced by Bickel-Lehmann).
We show that ecient claims for S.S.D. are claims that maximize an analog of
Sharpe ratio where standard deviation is replaced by a dispersion term. We
then, endogenize the price system by introducing a concept of second order
stochastic dominance equilibrium (denoted  2 equilibrium). It is interesting
to compare S.S.D. equilibria to CAPM equilibria. In CAPM, agents' consump-
tions are ane increasing functions of aggregate endowment and the pricing
density is an ane decreasing function of aggregate endowment while in a
3 2 equilibrium (equivalently in a v.N.M. equilibrium with increasing strictly
concave utilities), agents' consumptions are non decreasing functions of aggre-
gate endowment and aggregate endowment is a non decreasing function of the
pricing density.
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we recall basic denitions
used in the paper. In section 3, we dene and characterize the concepts of
second order stochastic dominance demand and strong eciency. In section
4, we dene the utility price of a contingent claim, study its properties and
relate it to the concept of law-invariant risk-measure. Sections ve and six are
devoted to Pareto optimality and equilibrium analysis.
2 The model and a few basic denitions
Given as primitive is a probability space (
;2
;P). We assume that 
 is
nite, 
 = f1;;kg and that P = ((1);(2); ;(k)). Contingent claims
are identied to elements of IRk. A contingent claim x 2 IRk is denoted by
x = (x(1);;x(k)). Two contingent claims x and y identically distributed
are denoted x d y. Given a price ~ p 2 IRk, we dene the associated "pricing




(k)). We therefore have ~ p  x = EP(px) that we
shall now on write E(px).
Let us rst recall a few denitions. Let Fx denote the distribution function
of a contingent claim x and F  1
x its generalised inverse:
F 1
x (t) = inffz 2 IR j Fx(z)  tg
2.1 Second order stochastic dominance
Denition 1 A contingent claim x dominates y in the sense of second or-
der stochastic dominance (resp strictly dominates) denoted x 2y (respectively





 1 Fx(s)ds; 8 t 2 IR







y (s)ds; 8 t 2]0;1],
(resp. with a strict inequality for some t),
43. E[u(x)]  E[u(y)]; 8 u : IR ! IR concave increasing
(resp. with a strict inequality for some u concave increasing),
4. y d x + " for some " such that E[" j x]  0
(resp. where in addition P(" 6= 0) > 0).
Two contingent claims x and y are second-order equivalent, denoted by x 2 y,
if 1, 2 or 3 holds with equality throughout. In other words, x 2 y i x d y.
It follows from assertion 4 and Jensen's inequality that x2y i for every
u : IR ! IR strictly concave increasing, E[u(x)] > E[u(y)].
We shall extensively use this property.
2.2 Comonotone functions
Denition 2 1. Two random variables x and y are comonotone (resp an-
ticomonotone) if [x(s)   x(s0)][y(s)   y(s0)]  0; for all (s;s0) 2 
2 (resp
[x(s)   x(s0)][y(s)   y(s0)]  0; for all(s;s0) 2 
2).
2. A family of random variables (xi)n
i=1 2 IRkn is comonotone if
[xi(s)   xi(s0)][xj(s)   xj(s0)]  0; for all i;j and for all (s;s0) 2 
2.
Remark: Let f : IR ! IR and g : IR ! IR be two non-decreasing functions.
Then if x = f(y) or y = g(x), then x and y are comonotone but the converse
does not necessarely hold. To be precise, two random variables x and y are
comonotone i for all s 2 
, (x(s);y(s)) belongs to the graph of a non de-
creasing correspondence.
An alternative characterization of comonotonicity (see Denneberg [1994])
expresses each xi as a non-decreasing, one-Lipschitz function of their sum:
Lemma 1 Denneberg's Lemma A family of of random variables (xi)n
i=1 2
IRkn is comonotone if and only if there exist continuous and non-decreasing
functions (fi)n
i=1 (fi : IR ! IR) with
n X
i=1




We shall also make use of the following results:




x (1   t)F  1






2. If x and y are comonotone, then cov (x;y)  0.




3 Demand and Eciency
In this section, we dene and characterize the demand correspondence for
second order stochastic dominance. We show that the demand at pricing
density p is the set of non decreasing functions of p which fulll the budget
constraint. We furthermore show that the demand correspondence for second
order stochastic dominance is the union of the demand functions for strictly
concave increasing expected utility maximisers. The proof is based on an
argument originally made by Peleg and Yaari (1975) and further used by
Jouini-Kallal (2001)
3.1 Demand correspondence for second order stochastic dom-
inance
Let (p;w) 2 IRk+1 be a pricing-density income pair. The demand correspon-
dence for second order stochastic dominance is dened by:
2(p;w) = fx 2 IRk j E(px)  w and 9 n x02x with E(px0)  wg
We start with a lemma:
Lemma 3 Let x 2 IRk be such that E(px) = w and such that x(`) < x(j)
implies p(`)  p(j) ( resp p(`) > p(j)). Then there exists a strictly in-
creasing and concave (resp strictly concave) function u such that x solves (
maxE[u(c)) s.t.
E(pc)  E(px) = w
The proof, due to Peleg and Yaari [1975], is recalled in the appendix for
completeness.
Proposition 1
61. If 2(p;w) 6= ;, then p  0.
2. x 2 2(p;w) i E(px) = w and x is a non decreasing function of p.
The proof that x 2 2(p;w) implies that E(px) = w and x is a non decreasing
function of p is due to Dybvig [1988]. The proof of the converse statement
follows easily from Lemma 1. It may be found in the appendix.
Corollary 1




E(pc)  E(px) = w
2. 2(p;w) 6= ; i p  0.
Proof. If x 2 2(p;w), the existence of u follows from the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. The converse statement follows from the denition of 2(p;w) and the
caracterisation of strict second order stochastic dominance.
3.2 Demand for  2 averse utility
It follows from the previous section that the demand correspondence for second
order stochastic dominance is the union of v.N.M. demands. This naturally
raises the question of whether other families of utility may be considered. We
dene " 2 risk averse" utilities. These utilities have been used in various set-
tings (for example, eciency and insurance by Chew and Zilcha (1990)) and
Gollier-Schlesinger(1996), Pareto-optimality and nance by Kim (1994)).
Let us rst recall a denition.
Denition 3 A continuous utility v : IRk ! IR is \ 2 risk averse" if x 2y
implies v(x)  v(y) and strict risk averse denoted 2 risk averse if x2y
implies v(x) > v(y).
Examples and characterizations of risk averse utilities may be found in
Chateauneuf et al(1997) and in Chew et al (1995).  2 risk aversion does not
imply concavity or quasi-concavity of the utility function.
7Let v : IRk ! IR be a 2 averse monotone increasing utility and let
v(p;w) =
(
x 2 IRk j
x = arg max v(y) s.t.
E(py)  w
)
Since consumptions sets are unbounded, v(p;w) may be empty, even in the
case of v.N.M. utilities (see Bertzekas [1973] for example). Let us also dene:
V(p;w) =

x 2 IRk j 9 v
2




In particular, if x 2 v(p;w), then there exists u : IR ! IR strictly concave
increasing such that x solves
(
maxEu(c) s.t.
E(pc)  E(px) = w
Proof. The inclusion 2(p;w)  V(p;w) follows from corollary 1. To prove
that V(p;w)  2(p;w), one has to prove that, if x 2 V, then E(px) = w and
x is a non decreasing function of p. Assume that for some (`;j);x(`) < x(j)
and p(`)  p(j). Then, as in the proof of Proposition 1, there exists x0 such
that x02x and E(px0)  w, hence v(x0) > v(x), contradicting the denition
of x. Hence x(`) < x(j) implies p(`) > p(j). Furthermore since v is monotone
increasing, E(px) = w. The last assertion follows from corollary 1.
3.3 2 eciency
Let us next introduce the concept of strong eciency which turn out to gen-
eralize the concept of mean-variance eciency used in nance. We rst recall
the denition of Mean-Variance eciency.
3.3.1 Mean-Variance eciency
Let W denote the set of "mean -variance utilities" W : IR IR+ ! IR strictly
increasing in the rst coordinate and strictly decreasing in the second.
A contingent claim x is mean-variance ecient if there exists W 2 W such
that x solves
(
max W(E(c);var(c)) subject to
E(pc)  E(px)
.
We recall that x is mean-variance ecient i there exists a 2 IR and b  0
such that x = a   bp. In other words, x is a decreasing ane function of p.
83.3.2 Strong eciency
In a similar way, we dene the set of 2 ecient claims.
SE2(p) =
(





It follows from Corollary 1 that
SE2(p) =
n










x 2 IRk j 9 v 
2





It follows from proposition 2 that
SEV(p) = SE2(p) =
n









A weaker concept of eciency will be introduced in next section.
4 Expenditure as a Measure of risk
Theorists have often used quantile based measures of risk. The Choquet in-
tegral with respect to a convex distortion is an example of such measures.
Following Dybvig's idea, we shall show that for some distortions, the Choquet
integral may be obtained as an expenditure under second stochastic order, for
a well-chosen price.
94.1 Denition of the Utility price








The value function of (E), e(p;x) is called "Utility price" by Jouini-Kallal
(2001). We keep their terminology. Let
 (p;x) =
(
x0 2 IRk j E(px0) = min E(pc)
c 2x;
)
be the set of minimizers.
A pricing-density is \revealing" if it is an injective function of the state of
the world, equivalently if ` 6= j implies p(`) 6= p(j).
The following properties may easily be proven:
Proposition 3 If  (p;x) 6= ;, then
1. p  0.
2. If x0 2  (p;x), then x0 is anti-comonotone with p,
3. If p is revealing, then if x0 2  (p;x), x0 is a function of p,
4. e(;x) is positively homogeneous of degree 1, concave and increasing. If
p 6 0, then e(;x) =  1.
Proof.
1. As in Proposition 1, assume that p(`) < 0 for some ` and that  (p;x) 6= ;.
Let x0(j) = x(j), x0(`) = x(`) + M, M > 0, then x02x and E(px0) < E(px),
a contradiction.
2. If  (p;x) 6= ;, by the same proof as Proposition 1, assertion 2, x0(j) < x0(`)
and p(j) < p(`) are incompatible. Hence x0(j) < x0(`) implies p(j)  p(`).
3. If p is revealing, by assertion 2, x0(j) < x0(`) implies p(j) > p(`). Hence x0
is a function of p.
10The proof of the last assertion is obvious.
We now generalize a result proven by Dybvig (1988) in the case of uniform
probability:
Proposition 4 If p  0, e(p;x) =
R 1
0 F 1
p (1   t)F  1
x (t)dt and  (p;x) 6= ; if
and only if p  0.
The proof may be found in the appendix.
Corollary 2 1) If p is revealing, then  (p;x) is a singleton.
2) If p is not revealing, then  (p;x) contains a unique function of p.
4.2 Properties of the Utility price
4.2.1 Capacities
We recall that a capacity on (
;2
) is a set function C : 2
 ! IR such that
C(;) = 0, C(
) = 1, and for all A;B 2 2
;A  B; implies C(A)  C(B). A
capacity C is convex if for all A;B 2 2
, C(A[B)+C(A\B)  C(A)+C(B).
Let x : 
 ! IR be a random variable. The Choquet integral of x with respect








Let f : [0;1] ! [0;1] non decreasing satisfy f(0) = 0; f(1) = 1 and P be
a probability on (
;2
). Then C = f(P) is a capacity. Moreover f(P) is a




f0(1   t)F  1
x (t)dt
4.2.2 Dispersion
The next two denitions related to the concept of dispersion of a random vari-
able are due to Bickel-Lehmann (1977).
11Denition 4 A contingent claim x 2 IRk dominates y 2 IRk for Bickel-




y (q)   F  1
y (p)  F  1
x (q)   F  1
x (p); 0 < p < q < 1
Equivalently the map p ! (F  1
x (p)   F  1
y (p)) is non increasing on (0;1).
Denition 5 A map  : IRk ! IR+ is a measure of spread if it satises
1. (ax) = jaj(x), for all x 2 IRk, for all a 2 IR,
2. (x + b) = (x); for all b 2 IR
3. (x) = ( x), for all x 2 IRk;
4. (x)  (y) if x 
BL
y.
Examples of measures of spread are standard deviation and (x) = [F  1
x (t) 
F 1
x (1 t)] for t > 1





x (t)   F  1
x (1   t))]d(t)
! 1

where  is a nite measure on (1
2;1).
4.2.3 Properties of the Utility price
We now elaborate on Dybvig's idea by introducing the dispersion order.
Proposition 5
1. Let r be dened by e(p;1) = E(p) = 1
1 + r. Then if p  0, (1 +r)e(p;x)
is a Choquet integral. More precisely (1+r)e(p;x) =
R
xd where  is a
convex distortion of P,  = pP.
2. Let D(p;x) =
E(x)
(1+r)   e(p;x). Then D(p;x)  0; 8x and if x 
BL
y, then
D(p;x)  D(p;y). Hence e(p;x) = E(x)
1 + r   D(p;x).
3. Let (p;x) = (D(p;x)+D(p; x)) =  (e(p;x)+e(p; x)). Then (p;x)
is a convex comonotone measure of dispersion of x.
12Remarks: 1. The distortion p is piecewise linear since its derivative which
is proportionnal to F  1
p is a step function.
2. p is called the Lorenz curve of p in the theory of measurement of inequal-
ity.
3. For p  0,  (1 + r)e(p;x) is a comonotone coherent measure of risk (see
Atzner et al (1999) and Delbaen (2000) for the denition and comments).
4.2.4 An example: The tail conditionnal expectation
Assume that p = 1A, then 1
(1+r) = P(A) and







x j x  F  1
x (P(A))
i
Hence (1 + r)e(1A;x) is the tail conditionnal expectation. The corresponding










x (t)   F  1
x (1   t))dt
which is one of the example of measure of dispersion that we gave, with  = 1.
4.3 Structure of the minimizers
4.3.1 The case of uniform probability
As Dybvig (1988) and Jouini-Kallal (2001), let us rst assume that the prob-
ability is uniform. The following results are essentially due to Jouini-Kallal
(2001).
Proposition 6
1.  (p;x) equals the convex hull of consumptions x0 that fullls x0 2 x and
x0 is anti-comonotone with p.
2. If p is revealing, then  (p;x) is a singleton: it is the unique non-
increasing function of p distributed as x .




134.3.2 The general case
Proposition 7 Let ai > 0 for all i and bi be such that
F 1












x (t)dt; for all i
The proof that follows from that of Proposition 4 is omitted.
4.4 Weakly-ecient claims
Following Dybvig (1988) and Jouini-Kallal (2001), we dene ecient claims
as claims for which there is no other less costly contingent claim at least as
good for every risk averse investor with v.N.M. increasing utility. More pre-
cisely:
Denition 6 A contingent claim x is  2 weakly-ecient at price p i there




Proposition 8 1. A contingent claim x is weakly-ecient at price p i
E(px) =min fc2xgE(pc). Equivalently i E(px) = e(p;x).
2. A contingent claim x is weakly-ecient at price p i x and p are anti-
comonotone.
3. A contingent claim x is weakly-ecient at price p i there exists v :




4. A contingent claim x with E(px) > 0 is ecient at price p i it maxi-
mizes





is the return of the contingent claim.
14Hence a contingent claim with positive price is ecient i an analog of Sharpe
ratio is maximized. The maximal value is (1 + r).
5 Pareto optimality
5.1 Denitions




i=1 !i denote aggregate endowment.
We rst give three denitions.
Denition 7 An allocation (~ xi)n
i=1 2 IRkn is a  2 Pareto optimum, if there
doesn't exist a feasible allocation (x0
i)n
i=1 2 IRkn such that x0
i 2xi, for every i,
with a strict inequality for some i.
Denition 8 A pair [p;(x
i)n
i=1] 2 IRk  IRkn is a  2 equilibrium if
1. For every i, E(px







Denition 9 A pair [p;(x
i)n
i=1] 2 IRkIRkn is a  2 equilibrium with trans-
fer payments if
1. There doesn't exist xi2x






The following result may easily be proven:
Proposition 9 1. If there exists (ui)n
i=1 increasing strictly concave such
that (xi)n
i=1 is a Pareto optimum of the associated economy, then (xi)n
i=1
is a  2 Pareto optimum.
2. If there exists (ui)n
i=1 increasing strictly concave such that [p;(x
i)n
i=1] 2
IRkIRkn is an equilibrium (resp an equilibrium with transfer payments)
of the associated economy, then [p;(x
i)n
i=1] 2 IRk  IRkn is a  2 equi-
librium (resp a  2 equilibrium with transfer payments).
15We shall prove that any  2 equilibrium (resp any  2 Pareto optimum) is
an equilibrium (resp a Pareto optimum) of a strictly concave v.N.M. economy.
The main tool of the proof is Peleg and Yaari's lemma.
5.2 Caracterisations of  2 Pareto optimality
Proposition 10 For a feasible allocation (xi)n
i=1, the following conditions are
equivalent
1. (xi)n
i=1 is a  2 Pareto optimum.
2. The family of random variables (xi)n
i=1 is comonotone.
3. There exists (fi)n




Id such that xi = fi(!).
4. For every p  0 such that !(j) < !(`) implies p(j) > p(`), there exists
(ui)n
i=1, ui : IR ! IR strictly concave increasing such that [p;(xi)n
i=1]
is an equilibrium with transfer payments of the corresponding v.N.M.
economy.
5. There exists (ui)n
i=1 increasing strictly concave such that (xi)n
i=1 is a
Pareto optimum of the associated economy.
Proposition 11 For a feasible allocation (xi)n
i=1, the following conditions are
equivalent
1. (xi)n
i=1 is a  2 Pareto optimum.
2. For any p  0 such that !(j) < !(`) implies p(j) > p(`), [p;(xi)n
i=1] is
a  2 equilibrium with transfer payments.
The next proposition shows that no new qualitative behavior may be obtained
by using risk averse utilities.
Proposition 12 For an allocation (xi)n
i=1, the following conditions are equiv-
alent
1. (xi)n
i=1 is a  2 Pareto optimum.
162. There exists (vi)n
i=1, vi : IRk ! IR monotone increasing, 2 averse such
that (xi)n
i=1 is a Pareto optimum of the associated economy.
Proof.
1: implies 2. It suces to take vi(x) = E(ui(x)) with ui constructed in Propo-
sition 10, assertion 5.
2: implies 1: since a Pareto optimum of a monotone increasing strictly strongly
averse economy is clearly a  2 Pareto optimum.
We now give another characterisation of Pareto optima .
Proposition 13 An allocation (xi)n
i=1 is a  2 Pareto optimum i (xi)n
i=1 is
feasible and for some p  0 revealing




e(p;xi), (the utility price of aggregate endowment is the sum
of the utility prices of individual consumptions).
Proof. If







as E(pxi)  e(p;xi), for every i, we have E(pxi) = e(p;xi);. Hence, for every
i, xi(j) > xi(k) implies that p(j) < p(k). Equivalently, for every i, xi is
a non increasing function of p which implies the comonotony of (xi)n
i=1 (see
Denneberg [1994], chapter four).
6 Second Order stochastic Dominance Equilibria
In this section, we characterize  2 equilibria. We show that the set of  2 equi-
libria coincides with the set of equilibria for strictly averse v.N.M. economy.
It also coincides with the set of equilibria for strictly strongly averse utilities.
We also show that a  2 equilibrium may be characterized by standard fea-
sibility and budget constraints and the conditions that aggregate endowment
is ecient with respect to the price system and its utility price is the sum of
individual utility prices.




i=1 feasible is a  2 equilibrium
i
1. p  0 and for every i, E(px
i) = E(p!i).
2. For every i, x




1. For every i, E(px
i) = E(p!i);
2. The family of random variables (x
i)n
i=1 is comonotone and ! is a non
increasing function of p.
Proof. It follows directly from Proposition 1 and corollary 1.
Proposition 15 A pair [p;(x
i)n
i=1] is a  2 equilibrium i there exist (ui)n
i=1,
ui : IR ! IR strictly concave increasing such that [p;(x
i)n
i=1] is the equilibrium
of the associated v.N.M. economy.
Proof. It follows from corollary 1.
Proposition 16 A pair [p;(x
i)n
i=1] is an equilibrium of an economy with
monotone strictly strongly averse utilities i it is a  2 equilibrium.
Proof. The proof which is obvious is omitted.
We further have:




i=1 feasible and p  0 and
fully revealing is a  2 equilibrium i






i) and e(p;!) = E(p!).
18Proof. The proof which is similar to that of Proposition 12 is omitted.
Let (!i)n
i=1 be xed. Let E2 be the set of  2-equilibria, EU be the set of
equilibria of a v.N.M. economy with (ui)n
i=1 increasing and strictly concave
and nally EV be the set of equilibria of an economy with monotone 2 averse
utilities. It follows from Propositions 14 and 15 that
E2 = EU = EV
Other sets of equilibria may be considered: the set of equilibria of a v.N.M.
economy with (ui)n
i=1 increasing and concave or the set of equilibria of an econ-
omy with monotone 2 averse utilities. It follows from Lemma 1 and from the
proof of Proposition 1 that these sets coincide and are equal to the set of pairs
[p;(xi)n
i=1] with p  0 and x
i and p anticomonotone for every i. w and
p are therefore anticomonotone but the family of equilibrium consumptions
is not necessarely anticomonotone.
It may also easily be seen that E2 contains the set of CAPM equilibria
which are characterized by the property that that consumptions are ane non
decreasing functions of the pricing density.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For completeness, we recall the proof which is due to Peleg and Yaari [1975].
Let
g(x(`)) = minfp(j);j s.t. x(j) = x(`)g g (x(`)) = maxfp(j);j s.t. x(j) = x(`)g
Assume w.l.o.g. x(1)  x(2)  x(k) Let g be dened as follows :
g(x) = g(x(1)) + (x(1)   x); if x < x(1)
g(x) = g(x(k))exp(x(k)   x); if x > x(k)
and g is right continuous, piecewise linear with potential discontinuity and
change of slope at x(1);x(2); ;x(k). Then g is positive and non increasing
(decreasing if x(`) < x(j) implies p(`) > p(j)). Let u(x) =
R x
0 g(t)dt. Then u
is strictly increasing and concave (resp strictly concave if x(`) < x(j) implies
19p(`) > p(j)). Let us remark that x solves
(
maxE[u(c)) s.t.
E(pc)  E(px) = w
since the




 (x(j))] = [g(x(j));g (x(j))] are fullled.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that (p;w) 6= ; and let x 2 (p;w). If p(`)  0 for some `, let x0 be
dened by x0(j) = x(j), 8 j 6= ` and x0(`) = x(`) + M, M > 0. Then x0 2x
and E(px0)  w, a contradiction.
To prove 2, assume that for some pair (`;j), x(`) < x(j) and p(`)  p(j).






x0(j) = x(j) + (`)
(j)[x(`)   x(j)] and x0(k) = x(k);k 6= (`;j).
We then have:
E(p(x0   x)) = (`)p(`)(x0(`)   x(`)) + (j)p(j)((x0(j)   x(j))
= (`)p(`)(x(j)   x(`)) + p(j)(`)(x(`)   x(j))
= (`)(x(j)   x(`))(p(`)   p(j))  0
while for any v.N.M. expected utility maximizer with a strictly concave
increasing u : IR ! IR
E[u(x0)   u(x)]









> (`)[u(x(j)) u(x(`))] + (`)u(x(`)) + [(j) (`)]u(x(j)) (j)u(x(j))
= 0
a contradiction.
 If (j) < (`), a similar proof may be given with x0(`) = x(`) +
(j)
(`)(x(j)   x(`)), x0(j) = x(`) and x0(k) = x(k) for k 6= (`;j).
20 If (j) = (`), it follows from the above proof that x(`) < x(j) and
p(`) > p(j) is impossible. Assume that (j) = (`); x(`) < x(j) and
p(`) = p(j). Let x0(`) = x0(j) = 1
2(x(`) + x(j)); x0(k) = x(k); k 6= (l;j).
Then E(px0) = E(px) while E[u(x0)] > E[u(x)] for any u strictly concave
increasing. A contradiction.
Hence x(`) < x(j) implies p(`) > p(j). In particular p(`) = p(j) implies
x(`) = x(j). Lastly as x + a2x, 8a 2 IRk
+, if x 2 (p;w), then E(px) = w.
Conversely, let x be such that E(px) = w and x(`) < x(j) implies p(`) >
p(j) and u be given by lemma 1. Assume that there exists x02x and E(px0) 
w, then E[u(x0)] > E[u(x)] while E(px0)  E(px), contradicting the optimal-
ity of x, for the v.N.M. utility.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Clearly if p has a negative coordinate, e(p;x) =  1. Assume p  0.




x (t)dt. It rst follows from Hardy-





p (1   t)F  1
c (t)]dt
Assume further that c 2 x. Since F  1
p (1   t) is a non negative, non increas-
ing step function, there exists ai 2 IR+;bi 2]0;1] such that F  1


























p (1   t)F  1
x (t)dt
since c 2 x.
To prove the converse inequality, it suces to prove that there exists a con-
tingent claim c 2 x such that E(pc) =
R 1
0 F 1
p (1   t)F  1
x (t)dt. Let us relabel
states of the world such that p(1)  p(2)  :::p(k). Let A1;:::;Ak be the
partition of [0;1] such that
F 1
p (1   t) = p(1)1A1(t) + :::p(l)1Al(t) + :::p(k)1Ak(t)

























p (1   t)F  1
x (t)dt
Consider the contingent claim c = (c(1);::: ;c(k)) in IRk. Since c(1)  ::: 
c(k), F  1
c = c(1)1A1+:::c(l)1Al+:::c(k)1Ak. By construction, F  1
c = E[F  1
x j
C] where C is the sigma-eld generated by the (Ai); i = 1;:::;k. Hence by
Jensen's inequality, F  1
c 2 F 1
x . Equivalently c 2 x. .
Proof of corollary 2. If p is revealing, the contingent claim c constructed in
the previous proof, is the non increasing function of p f(p); with f dened by
f(F 1
p (1   Id)) = E(F  1
x j F 1
p (1   Id)) (the conditionnal expectation being
taken with respect to the probability space ([0;1];B;) with  the Lebesgue
measure). Since p is revealing, it follows from proposition 3 that if c0 2  (p;x),
then c0 is a function of p. Let us show that if c0 = (p) is any (non increasing)
function of p that fullls c0  2 x and achieves the minimum, then c = c0.
Indeed, let ai > 0; bi 2]0;1] be such that F  1












p (1   t)(F  1

















Since c0  2 x, we have
R bi
0 (F 1
p (1   t))dt =
R bi
0 F 1






x (t)dt. Since (F  1
p (1 t)) is constant on each
interval [bi;bi+1], we get 1[bi;bi+1](t)(F  1





Hence  (p;x) is a singleton.
The second assertion also follows from the same proof. The function f dened
by f(F  1
p (1   Id)) = E(F  1
x j F 1
p (1   Id) is that unique function.
22.
Proof of Proposition 5
1) Let r be dened by E(p;1) = E(p) = 1
1 + r and let (1 + r)e(p;x) =
'(x). Clearly '(1) = 1 and ' is non decreasing. Furthermore, by Lemma
2, '(x + y) = '(x) + '(y) on comonotone functions. Hence by Schmeidler's
theorem [1986], ' is an integral with respect to a capacity . Let us show that
 is a convex distortion of P. Let x = 1A, then F  1




















is a convex distortion. If x  0,  (1 + r)e(p;x) is a comonotone coherent
measure of risk.
2) The covariance of two anticomonotone variable being non positive, D(p;x) =
E(x)
1 + r   e(p;x)  0. If x 
BL
y, then F  1
y   F 1
x is non decreasing, hence its
covariance with t ! F  1
p (1   t) is non positive. Hence D(p;y)  D(p;x). As
x 
BL




which implies that (p;x)  (p;y). One easily veries that all the other
properties of a measure of spread are veried.
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove assertion 1, let x0 2 x be such that x0(j) < x0(`) imply p(j)  p(`).








Eu(c)  Eu(x0) = Eu(x)
. If c 2x, then Eu(c)  Eu(x),
hence E(pc)  E(px0) which proves that x0 2  (p;x) and that  (p;x) con-
tains the convex hull of consumptions x0 that fullls x0 2 x and x0(j) < x0(`)
implies p(j)  p(`). Conversely, by Jouini-Kallal's lemma, fc 2xg = cof c 2
xg+IRk
+, hence if either c 2 cof c 2 xg and c is not anticomonotone with p or
c > y with y 2 x, then E(pc) > E(px0). Hence  (p;x) equals the convex hull
of consumptions x0 that fullls x0 2 x and x0(j) < x0(`) implies p(j)  p(`).
Assertion 2 follows assertion 1 and proposition 3. Lastly, to prove assertion 3,



























Proof of Proposition 8.
To prove assertion 1 , assume that x is weakly-ecient at price p and that there
exists c 2 x such that E(pc) < E(px). Then for " > 0, E(u(c +")) > E(u(x)
and fullls E(p(c+")) < E(px) for " > 0 small enough, contradicting the weak
eciency of x. Conversely if E(px) =min fcxgE(pc), then by Proposition 3,
x and p are anticomonotone and the existence of u follows from Lemma 1.
The equivalence between assertions 1 and 2 follows from Proposition 3 and
Lemma 1. The proof of assertion 3 which is similar to that of assertion 1 is
omitted.
To prove assertion 4, for any x, we have E(x)   (1 + r)E(px)  (1 +
r)D(p;x). Furthermore x is ecient at price p i E(x) (1+r)E(px) = (1+
r)D(p;x). If E(px) > 0, as D(p;x) is positively homogeneous, we equivalently
have
E(R(x))   (1 + r)
D(p;R(x))




is the return of the contingent claim. There is equality
if x is ecient:
Proof of Proposition 10.
1. implies 2. The original proof is due to Landsberger-Meilijson [1994]. We
use a method of proof due to Chateauneuf et al [1997]. Assume that (xi)n
i=1
are not comonotone. W.l.o.g. we may assume x1(1) > x1(2) and x2(1) < x2(2)
and x1(1) + x2(1)  x1(2) + x2(2). Let x0
1 and x0
2 be dened as follows:
x0
1(1) = x0
1(2) = (1)x1(1) + (2)x1(2)
(1) + (2)
x0
1(j) = x1(j); 8j > 2:
24x0
2 is dened so that the feasibility constraint is fullled:
x0
2(1) = x2(1) + (2)
(1) + (2)[x1(1)   x1(2)]
x0
2(2) = x2(2)   (1)
(1) + (2)[x1(1)   x1(2)]:
We have
E(x0








1  x1 and x0
2  x2, a contradiction.
2 implies 3 See Denneberg [1994], chapter four.
3 implies 4. Choose any p  0, such that !(j) < !(`) implies p(j) > p(`).
Then by assertion 3, xi(j) < xi(`) implies !(j) < !(`), hence p(j) > p(`).






i=1] is therefore an equilibrium
with transfer payments of the associated v.N.M. economy.
4 implies 5. Let (ui)n
i=1 be as constructed in 4. Then (xi)n
i=1 is a Pareto opti-
mum of the associated v.N.M. economy.
5 implies 1 The proof which is obvious is omitted
Proof of Proposition 11.
1 implies 2. If (xi)n
i=1 is a  2 Pareto optimum, then from Proposition 10 as-
sertion 4, for any p  0 such that !(j) < !(`) implies p(j) > p(`), [p;(xi)n
i=1]
is an equilibrium with transfer payments of a strictly concave economy, hence
by Proposition 9, a  2 equilibrium with transfer payments.
2 implies 1. Let [p;(xi)n
i=1] be a  2 equilibrium with transfer payments with
p  0. Assume that (xi)n
i=1) is not  2 Pareto optimal. Then there exists a
feasible allocation (x0
i)n
i=1 such that x0
i  
2
xi, for all i with a strict inequality
for some i. If x0
i 6= xi, by convexity, we may assume that x0
i 2 xi. Hence
E(px0
i) > E(pxi); for all i such that x0
i 6= xi. Summing over i, we get a contra-
diction with the feasibility of (x0
i)n
i=1. Hence (xi)n
i=1) is a  2 Pareto optimum.
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